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Generation	wars	over	Brexit	and	beyond:	How	young
and	old	are	divided	over	social	values
Pippa	Norris	explains	how	generation	gaps	divide	the	British	electorate	and	mainstream	parties.	She
writes	that	while	the	EU	referendum	was	a	prime	example	of	how	these	divisions	play	out	in	the	UK,	the
changing	nature	of	electoral	cleavages	raises	important	questions	about	politics	and	party	competition
in	western	democracies	more	generally.
The	Brexit	decision	shocked	Britain’s	image	of	itself,	and	sent	reverberations	around	the	world.	Until
recently,	Westminster	shared	a	broad	consensus	about	the	value	of	the	liberal	international	order
abroad	and	liberal	democratic	governance	at	home.	The	accord	reflected	a	cosmopolitan	vision,	convinced	of	the
benefits	of	access	to	global	markets,	open	border,	and	international	cooperation.	In	Europe,	the	‘permissive
consensus’	allowed	Brussels	technocrats	to	pursue	a	common	vision	of	deepening	and	enlarging	the	EU,	without
giving	a	direct	voice	to	the	European	public	on	the	matter	–	even	though	polls	suggest	that	this	goal	was	increasingly
rejected	by	many	of	its	citizens.
At	home,	as	well,	the	major	UK	parties	differed	on	many	economic	and	social	policies,	and	the	Conservatives	have
obviously	been	deeply	divided	on	Europe	ever	since	Thatcher.	Nevertheless,	beyond	policy	debates,	during	the
1990s	British	politicians	on	both	sides	of	the	aisle	seemed	to	share	broad	agreement	about	the	underlying	rules	of
the	game,	tolerant	respect	for	robust	pluralistic	debate	at	Westminster,	and	support	for	liberal	democratic	norms.	This
includes	the	values	of	liberal	freedoms,	social	tolerance,	and	respect	for	diversity,	the	protection	of	minority	rights,
and	the	rejection	of	the	forces	of	authoritarianism,	racism	and	xenophobia.	Mainstream	parties	agreed	to	quarantine
the	BNP,	the	National	Front,	and	other	fringe	alt-right	white	nationalists.
In	recent	years,	however,	the	outcome	of	the	Brexit	referendum	and	its	dithering	aftermath,	the	bitterly	divisive	splits
within	both	the	major	parties,	and	polarizing	battles	over	anti-Semitism	in	the	Labour	party	and	Islamophobia	in	the
Tories,	have	shaken	faith	in	the	traditional	tolerance	of	British	society,	raised	challenges	to	the	liberal	consensus
concerning	the	principles	of	democratic	governance,	and	threatened	the	stability	and	unity	of	the	UK.
The	well-known	story	behind	Britain’s	momentous	decision	to	seek	a	divorce	from	the	European	Union,	after	more
than	four	decades,	and	the	historical	role	of	UKIP	in	this	process,	rests	ultimately	on	‘supply-side’	factors	in
Westminster	politics	–	including	the	critical	impact	of	contingent	historical	events	and	key	blunders	by	spectacularly
inept	and	short-sighted	political	leaders.
On	the	‘demand	side’	of	the	equation,	once	the	referendum	was	triggered,	several	factors	help	to	explain	the	main
drivers	of	public	opinion	and	voting	behavior	determining	the	outcome	of	the	2016	referendum	–	as	well	as	the	ups
and	downs	of	UKIP’s	electoral	support	during	the	2015	and	2017	general	elections.	Work	by	Harold	D.	Clarke	et	al.
argues	that	Euroscepticism	was	fueled	by	anxieties	about	government	management	of	immigration	and,	to	a	lesser
extent,	the	economy	and	NHS.	But	a	broader	comparative	perspective	suggests	that	Brexit	is	part	of	the
phenomenon	of	authoritarian-populism	which	has	been	sweeping	across	the	globe,	so	it	needs	a	more	general
explanation	than	one	based	on	British	party	politics	alone.
Beyond	specific	policy	issues,	several	authors	have	sought	to	describe	the	emergence	of	a	long-term	cultural
cleavage.	For	example,	David	Goodhart	depicts	Britain	as	split	between	the	‘Anywheres’,	the	degree-educated,
geographically	mobile	professionals	who	embrace	new	people	and	experiences,	and	define	themselves	by	their
achievements;	and	the	‘Somewheres’,	with	a	fixed	identities	rooted	in	their	hometown	community,	unsettled	by	rapid
change,	particularly	the	influx	of	migrants,	the	growth	of	multiethnic	cities,	and	more	fluid	gender	identities.
Many	have	referred	loosely	to	the	‘Left-behinds’	as	an	economic	category	referring	to	the	losers	from	global	trade.
These	ideas	partially	capture	some	of	the	tensions	observed	in	the	UK	and	can	be	applied	elsewhere,	such	as	the
familiar	divisions	observed	between	the	God	and	Guns	values	of	heartland	Trump	America	and	the	Climate	Change
and	Diversity	values	of	coastal	Obama-nostalgic	elites,	or	between	voting	support	for	Macron	in	urbane	Paris	and	Le
Pen	in	Ardennes,	Alsace	and	Marseilles.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Generation wars over Brexit and beyond: How young and old are divided over social values Page 1 of 6
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-08-18
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/08/18/generation-wars-over-brexit-and-beyond-how-young-and-old-are-divided-over-social-values/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
But	observing	the	contrasts	doesn’t	help	to	explain	the	contemporary	reemergence	of	this	classic	center-periphery
geographic	division	–	and	thus	why	some	people	have	become	increasingly	more	reluctant	to	embrace	social	change
than	others.	Impressionistic	notions	such	the	distinction	between	‘Anywheres’	and	‘Somewheres’,	or	‘winners’	and
‘losers’	from	global	markets,	are	also	fuzzy	concepts	to	measure.	The	distinction	can	also	sound	patronizing,	as
though	the	Left-behinds	are	deeply	irrational	and	they	just	need	to	get	with	the	culture.
In	a	new	book	on	Cultural	Backlash	forthcoming	in	the	fall,	we	argue	that	support	for	Authoritarian-Populist	parties
and	leaders	in	Europe	and	America,	and	the	bitter	polarization	over	Brexit	in	the	UK	electorate,	reflects	culture	wars
over	fundamental	social	values	dividing	young	and	old	in	many	Western	societies.	There	is	widespread	evidence
from	the	British	Attitudes	Survey	that	British	society	continues	to	move	in	a	socially-liberal	direction,	with	younger	and
college-educated	people	being	far	more	tolerant	than	older	and	less-educated	groups	on	same-sex	marriage,
LGBTQ	rights,	abortion,	euthanasia,	pornography,	and	pre-marital	sex.
Millennials	are	also	far	more	likely	to	have	voted	Remain,	while	a	study	of	young	people	in	Britain	concluded	that
many	are	concerned	about	the	negative	impact	of	Brexit	on	multi-ethnic	communities	–	and	they	expressed	concern
about	rising	intolerance,	discrimination,	racism	and	the	decline	of	Britain’s	multicultural	image.	They	were	also
resentful	that	the	decision	to	leave	the	EU	was	made	by	the	older	generation	and	concerned	that	Brexit	would	limit
their	opportunities	to	live	and	work	in	Europe.
Meanwhile,	the	Interwar	generation	supported	Leave,	and	UKIP,	because	they	tend	to	endorse	a	broader	range	of
socially-conservative	and	authoritarian	values	associated	with	nationalism,	Euroscepticism,	and	immigration.	The
generation	gap	in	Europe	and	America	is	linked	with	cultural	cleavages	around	these	issues.	As	the	old	Left-Right
divisions	of	social	class	identities	have	faded	in	Britain,	an	emerging	cultural	war	deeply	divides	voters	and	parties
around	values	of	national	sovereignty	versus	cooperation	among	EU	member	states;	respect	for	traditional	families
and	marriage	versus	support	for	gender	equality	and	feminism,	tolerance	of	diverse	lifestyles	and	gender	fluid
identities;	the	importance	of	protecting	manufacturing	jobs	versus	environmental	protection	and	climate	change;	and
restrictions	on	immigration	and	closed	borders	versus	openness	towards	refugees,	migrants,	and	foreigners.In	the
long-term,	the	silent	revolution	continues	to	move	the	Western	societies	gradually	in	a	more	liberal	direction.	In	the
short-term,	however,	older	generations	are	far	more	likely	to	vote	than	the	young	–	and	the	authoritarian	reaction
against	progressive	values	has	mobilized	to	become		significant	force	in	politics.
Our	book	accounts	for	the	rise	of	Authoritarian-Populists	in	many	Western	societies	by	emphasizing	the	long-term
consequences	of	the	Silent	Revolution	in	cultural	values.	This	started	to	become	evident	with	post-materialist	value
change	among	the	younger	and	college	educated	generation	who	grew	up	in	affluent	post-industrial	societies	during
the	1960s	and	1970s.	The	proportion	of	more	socially-conservative	older	cohorts	holding	traditional	values	towards
core	identity	issues,	such	as	those	surrounding	the	values	of	religion,	family,	and	nation,	has	gradually	faded	away
over	the	years	and	younger	generations	with	more	socially	liberal	views	gradually	took	their	place	in	the	population.
The	proportion	of	Interwar	and	Baby	Boomers	in	Western	societies	has	gradually	declined,	losing	hegemonic	status
and	cultural	power	–	although	they	usually	remain	a	bare	majority	of	active	voters	and	thus	their	preferences
continue	to	be	over-reflected	in	representative	bodies.	At	a	certain	point,	a	tipping	point	occurs	in	society,	as	the
proportion	of	those	holding	traditional	values	becomes	the	new	minority	in	the	population.	This	experience,	we
theorize,	triggers	an	authoritarian	reflex	among	the	older	and	less	educated	sectors	most	resistant	to	cultural	change,
who	seek	strong	leaders	to	defend	socially-conservative	values,	blaming	liberal	elites	like	Westminster	politicians,	the
media,	academic	experts,	Eurocrats	and	the	establishment	in	general,	as	well	as	out-groups	like	immigrants	and
foreigners	for	lack	of	respect	for	traditional	values.
This	account	can	be	applied	to	help	explain	the	outbreak	of	cultural	wars	over	Brexit	and	its	dispiriting	aftermath.	If
so,	then	the	division	between	the	Leave	and	Remain	camps	should	be	found	to	revolve	around	the	cultural	cleavage
between	authoritarian	and	libertarian	values,	especially	where	Leave	is	endorsed	by	older	generations	who	feel
threatened	by	the	rapid	pace	of	cultural	change	and	the	loss	of	respect	for	traditional	ways	of	life.	The	threat	to
socially-conservative	values	is	expected	to	have	triggered	an	authoritarian	reflex	among	these	groups	–	emphasizing
the	importance	of	maintaining	collective	security	by	enforcing	strict	conformity	with	traditional	mores	within	the	tribe,	a
united	front	against	outsiders,	and	loyalty	towards	tribal	leaders.
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This	orientation	is	reinforced	by	populist	leadership	rhetoric	reasserting	the	legitimate	voice	of	‘Us’	through	claiming
‘power	to	the	people’,	denigrating	the	authority	of	Westminster	politicians	at	home	and,	of	course,	Eurocrats	and	EU
institutions	abroad.	The	cultural	backlash	thesis	argues	that	a	tipping	point	in	the	long-term	process	of	cultural
change	has	been	mobilized	and	reinforced	by	authoritarian-populist	leaders,	whether	opportunistically	motivated	to
advance	their	personal	ambitions	(Boris	Johnson?)	or	whether	they	share	similar	values	(Donald	Trump?)	or	a	bit	of
both.	These	developments	reflect	a	new	cultural	cleavage	in	party	competition	and	in	the	electorate,	emerging	not
just	in	Britain,	but	also	in	many	other	Western	societies.
What	evidence	supports	this	thesis?	Cultural	Backlash	provides	a	broad	cross-national	comparison	across	Western
societies.	For	a	snapshot	on	some	of	the	evidence	in	the	case	of	the	UK,	we	can	draw	on	the	British	Election	Study
(BES)	panel	survey	of	31,196	respondents	conducted	by	YouGov	over	13	waves	from	February	2014	until	after	the
June	2017	general	election.
The	survey	evidence	is	most	clear-cut	and	consistent	across	numerous	polls	for	the	sizeable	generation	gaps
observed	in	voting	for	Brexit	and	in	recent	general	elections	in	the	UK.	Figure	1	illustrates	the	contrasts	in	the	BES,
demonstrating	that	roughly	twice	as	many	of	the	Interwar	generation	voted	Leave	compared	with	the	Millennials.
Note:	“In	the	referendum	on	Britain’s	membership	of	the	European	Union,	how	did	you	vote?”.	Source:	British	Election	Study	Internet	Panel	Waves	1-13.	Wave	9
post-Brexit	(24	June	to	6	July	2016)
What	explains	the	generational	gaps	over	leaving	the	EU	and	support	for	UKIP?	We	suggest	that	the	Millennials	and
Gen	X	disliked	the	Leave	camp	and	UKIP’s	appeals	to	English	nationalism	and	white	nativism,	racial	and	ethnic
intolerance,	and	social	conservatism.	They	were	more	strongly	attracted	to	other	parties	with	a	cosmopolitan	outlook
and	socially-liberal	policies	on	cultural	and	moral	issues,	exemplified	by	Labour’s	manifesto	pledges	to	support
LGBTQ	equality,	women’s	rights,	anti-racism,	protecting	animal	welfare,	lowering	the	voting	age	to	16,	supporting
international	development,	and	building	sustainable	environments.
Figure	2:	Authoritarian	values	predict	voting	for	Leave	and	UKIP
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Generation wars over Brexit and beyond: How young and old are divided over social values Page 3 of 6
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-08-18
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/08/18/generation-wars-over-brexit-and-beyond-how-young-and-old-are-divided-over-social-values/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Note:	Authoritarian	values	in	Britain	can	be	gauged	using	a	BES	100-point	standardized	scale	calculated	from	the	following	agree/disagree	items:	“(1)	Young
people	today	don’t	have	enough	respect	for	traditional	British	values;	(2)	People	who	break	the	law	should	be	given	stiffer	sentences;	(3)	For	some	crimes,	the
death	penalty	is	the	most	appropriate	sentence;	(4)	Schools	should	teach	children	to	obey	authority;	(5)	The	law	should	always	be	obeyed,	even	if	a	particular	law
is	wrong;	(6)	Censorship	of	films	and	magazines	is	necessary	to	uphold	moral	standards.”
Figure	3:	Populist	values	predict	voting	for	Leave	and	UKIP
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Note:	Populism	can	be	measured	in	from	the	BES	using	a	similar	100-point	standardized	scale	constructed	from	the	following	agree/disagree	items:	“1)	The
politicians	in	the	UK	Parliament	need	to	follow	the	will	of	the	people;	2)	The	people,	and	not	politicians,	should	make	our	most	important	policy	decisions;		3)	I
would	rather	be	represented	by	a	citizen	than	by	a	specialized	politician;	4)	Elected	officials	talk	too	much	and	take	too	little	action;	5)	What	people	call
“compromise”	in	politics	is	really	just	selling	out	on	one’s	principles.”	Source:	British	Election	Study	Internet	Panel	Waves	1-13.
To	reduce	the	risk	of	attitudinal	conditioning	by	prior	party	voting	preferences,	authoritarian	values	were	measured	in
waves	conducted	months	before	people	went	to	the	polls,	and	they	are	designed	to	tap	into	a	broad	sense	of	the
value	of	social	conformity	and	obedience	towards	authority,	without	asking	directly	about	policy	issues	such	as
Euroscepticism	or	anti-immigrant	attitudes.
After	controlling	for	the	standard	socio-economic	and	demographic	variables,	the	results	show	that	support	for	both
Authoritarian	and	Populist	values	strongly	predicted	Leave	voting.	As	Figure	2	illustrates,	authoritarian-libertarian
values	strongly	predict	the	Leave	vote	in	Brexit	and	support	for	UKIP.	Similarly	disparities	can	be	observed	among
those	scoring	highest	in	the	populism	scale.	Moreover	these	patterns	predict	not	only	who	voted	Leave	in	the	EU
referendum,	but	also	support	for	UKIP	in	the	2015	and	2017	general	elections.	The	data	confirms	that	authoritarian
and	populist	values	were	strongly	linked	with	generational	gaps	and	with	voting	behavior	in	Brexit,	as	expected.
Therefore,	the	evidence	suggests	that	generation	gaps	revolving	around	cultural	issues	deeply	divide	the	electorate
and	factions	within	mainstream	parties	as	well.	The	Leave	vote	mobilized	the	older	generation	by	appealing	to
nationalistic	and	nativist	identities,	achieving	a	bare	majority	favoring	divorce	from	the	EU,	while	Gen	X	and	the
Millennials	were	more	pro-EU	–	but	also	far	less	likely	to	get	to	the	polls.	If	a	second	referendum	were	to	be	held
today,	the	generation	gap	in	turnout	is	likely	to	prove	critical	for	the	outcome.	This	development	raises	important
challenges	about	the	changing	nature	of	electoral	cleavages	and	party	competition	in	Britain	and	elsewhere.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	is	drawn	from	Pippa	Norris	and	Ronald	Inglehart	2018	(forthcoming).	Cultural	Backlash:	Trump,
Brexit	and	Authoritarian	Populism.	NY:	Cambridge	University	Press	and	originally	appeared	at	our	sister	site,	British
Politics	and	Policy.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Pixabay	(Public	Domain)
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